Product overview

Vitrinode enrols Linux hosts with their own cryptographic identity, collects their inventory, runs a fixed set of signed remote operations and matches hosts up with Proxmox VE. Administrators sign in with security keys and everything that matters is audited. It's not at v1.0 yet, and the table below shows where each part is up to.

On this page: Overview· Capabilities· Platforms

What it is for

Once you've got a mix of bare metal, VMs and containers, it gets hard to keep track of which Linux hosts are reachable, what they're running and who's done what to them. Vitrinode puts host visibility, inventory and a limited set of operations in one place, with device identity and audit records behind each step. It's meant to sit alongside SSH and configuration management and help people who already know Linux. It isn't a managed support service.

Capabilities

These describe the development build. None of it means production-ready. Implemented means built and tested, with the testing written up in the engineering docs. In development means there's working code but it's incomplete or hasn't passed acceptance yet. Planned means it's on the roadmap but not built.

Capability status as of 30 October 2026
Capability Status Scope
Identity & access
Device enrolment Implemented A single-use provisioning token that lasts ten minutes and can be tied to a hostname. The host generates its own private key and sends a certificate signing request. The key never leaves the host.
Mutual TLS transport Implemented Every connection between agent and server is authenticated in both directions against Vitrinode's own device CA.
Revocation enforcement Implemented Certificate and device revocation are checked against the server's records on every agent request. A valid handshake isn't enough on its own.
Passwordless administrator sign-in Implemented WebAuthn/FIDO2 security keys only. You can register more than one key per account.
Step-up authentication Implemented A fresh security-key check, enforced by the server, before revoking a device, re-baselining attestation, adding a security key or creating a privileged job. SSH certificates each need their own check, tied to that request. Read-only jobs only need a valid session.
Inventory & visibility
Device list & heartbeat Implemented Enrolled devices with whether they're alive and when they were last seen, plus a device page with OS, kernel, agent version, trust state, attestation and Proxmox link.
System, storage & network facts Implemented CPU, memory, load and uptime; mounted filesystems and block devices; interfaces and listening TCP/UDP sockets.
systemd unit health Implemented Per-unit load, active and sub state.
Package & update state Implemented for APT Installed package count, upgradable packages and whether a reboot is needed, on Debian and Ubuntu. RPM-based collection for SUSE and RHEL isn't done yet.
Docker presence & objects Implemented Daemon reachability, containers and images.
Per-host inventory view & change timeline Planned Facts are already collected and stored so changes can be tracked. Showing them per host, with history and diffs, is Phase 9 on the roadmap.
Operations
Typed remote jobs Implemented Signed, expiring, replay-protected jobs from a fixed list: system.status, systemd.list, systemd.status, apt.list_updates and systemd.restart. No general shell execution. Jobs go in through the server API for now, and a jobs interface is planned.
Trust-gated privileged jobs Implemented systemd.restart needs step-up, and the target device has to be TRUSTED both when the job is created and when it's dispatched. Refused requests are audited.
Privileged executor separation Implemented The agent that talks to the network runs unprivileged, and privileged work goes to a separate executor on the host over a Unix socket. The executor checks each job's signature itself, so a compromised agent doesn't get root just from that.
Executor trust hardening Implemented The signing key and device identity are read from root-owned paths, jobs meant for another device are refused, and each job runs at most once even across restarts. Tested and accepted on disposable hosts, not rolled out to enrolled hosts yet.
Host clock health check Implemented The executor refuses privileged jobs when the host says its clock isn't synchronised. It's a health check, not trusted time. Not rolled out to enrolled hosts yet.
Trust & audit
Device attestation Implemented vTPM quotes over measured-boot PCR state where there's a TPM, and weaker software evidence where there isn't, which is never shown as equivalent. The result is the device's trust state. It's re-checked periodically, and stale or failed evidence downgrades it.
Trust-loss detection Implemented If a device loses TRUSTED status while a privileged job delivered to it, or an SSH certificate issued for it, is still valid, that's recorded as an audit event. It only detects it. Neither can be pulled back.
Audit records Implemented Append-only records for sign-in, sign-out, step-up, credential registration, revocation, re-baselining, the job lifecycle and SSH certificate issuance. Enrolment and token creation aren't recorded yet. An interface for browsing the log is planned.
Access & integrations
Proxmox VE correlation Implemented Read-only VM and container inventory from one cluster, synced periodically, with a marker when data's stale. Links to enrolled devices are confirmed by an administrator. No VM lifecycle actions.
Short-lived SSH certificates In development OpenSSH user certificates lasting up to 15 minutes, issued after a security-key check tied to the request. Principals are limited per user, root is refused and there's a per-user issuance limit. Each certificate names one device, which has to be TRUSTED when it's issued, and that host only accepts it for accounts set up for certificate login. The executor only installs the CA public key if it matches a fingerprint pinned at provisioning. Tested end to end on disposable hosts with a development-only software CA, and not rolled out to enrolled hosts. No hardware-backed key and no revocation list yet.
SSH CA key on dedicated hardware (Vitrinode-HSM) In development Signing, generating the CA key on the device and keeping it across reboots all work on a development board. Production key protection and connecting it to the server are still to do. More on the Hardware signing page.
Browser terminal Planned An optional thin proxy over a normal SSH session.

Supported platforms

Vitrinode is aimed at the four main enterprise Linux families, but they're at different stages. Targeted means it's in scope, implemented means the code paths exist, and validated means it's been run on real hosts and the results written up.

Platform coverage as of 30 October 2026
Platform Current coverage Detail
Debian Validated The main development target. Enrolment, inventory, jobs, the privileged executor, attestation and SSH certificate login have all been run on real Debian hosts.
Ubuntu Implemented Shares Debian's APT, systemd and agent code paths. Enrolment and TPM attestation have been run on Ubuntu 22.04 and 24.04 test VMs. On 22.04 the cloud image updates the Secure Boot revocation list once after first boot, so a baseline taken during that first boot won't match later ones.
SUSE Linux Enterprise Targeted Host, system, storage, network and systemd collection aren't distribution-specific, so they should work. Package inventory (zypper/RPM) and validation are still to do.
Red Hat Enterprise Linux Targeted Same as SUSE for the general collectors. Package inventory (dnf/RPM), SELinux compatibility and validation are still to do.
Docker Validated Container and image inventory on managed hosts, checked against a real Docker host. No container lifecycle actions.
Proxmox VE Validated Read-only VM and container correlation with one cluster, tested against a live cluster.

Windows and macOS aren't in scope. Hosts need synchronised time (NTP), because job expiry and SSH certificate validity depend on it.

Questions about a capability

If you've got questions about any of the above, or how it'd work in your environment, you can ask before v1.0.

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