A single-purpose device
Built on a Raspberry Pi Pico 2 (RP2350). It isn't a general keystore or a smart card. v1 holds exactly one key, the SSH user CA, and only does a few things: report its identity, return the CA public key, and issue an SSH user certificate within policy. The CA key is generated on the device during provisioning, which needs a physical button press, and is then kept across reboots.
TrustZone separation
The RP2350's Arm TrustZone-M keeps the code that touches the key apart from the code that talks to the host. The Secure world holds the key, re-checks every field of a request on its own copy, checks policy and does the Ed25519 signature. The Non-secure world only does USB and message framing, holds no secrets, and can only reach the Secure world through a thin, typed gateway. The idea is that a memory-safety bug in the USB or parsing code can't get to the key. Tests on the device confirm the key isn't in Non-secure memory or in any response.
Standard cryptography
Signing, hashing and random numbers use a pinned build of HACL, a well-known verified crypto library. The chip's hardware RNG goes through standard health tests and conditioning before it seeds an HMAC-DRBG.
Device-held clock
The production design has a battery-backed real-time clock inside the sealed enclosure, so the device has its own idea of the time that doesn't depend on the host. The prototype RTC has passed hardware bring-up, but trusted time isn't implemented yet. The plan is for certificate validity to be set by the device's own clock plus a monotonic floor it won't go back past, and not by whatever time the host claims it is.
Sealed enclosure
The production device is meant to ship sealed, with only USB and a status LED on the outside. No debug header, no boot override, and no way to re-key it once it's locked. It talks to the host using a framed binary protocol (VNHSM/1) over a USB vendor interface, one request at a time.