How Vitrinode compares

Vitrinode manages a single Linux estate. Every host gets its own cryptographic identity, remote operations are limited to a fixed set, and it's meant to be simple to run.

This page covers how it relates to tools you might already use, and when it's not the right choice.

On this page: Compare· Approach· Limitations· Where it fits

Where Vitrinode fits

It overlaps with a few established kinds of tool. Where one of those does a job better, the idea is to run it alongside Vitrinode.

Where Vitrinode fits
Need What Vitrinode gives you Where other tools fit
Managing a Linux estate securely Device identity, mTLS, inventory, typed signed jobs, revocation and an audit trail in one place. Config management or access tools alongside it for wider automation or interactive shells.
Controlled remote operations A fixed set of typed actions, signed jobs, privilege separation and replay protection. Ansible or Rundeck if you need broad, arbitrary automation.
Host and Proxmox visibility Guest state from Proxmox matched against enrolled agent state. Proxmox itself for anything to do with VM lifecycle.
Admin access WebAuthn/FIDO2-only sign-in with server-enforced step-up. SSH, Teleport or Tailscale for interactive shell sessions.
Small, single-estate setups A simple deployment and trust model. An enterprise RMM if you need thousands of endpoints, multi-tenancy or wider MSP workflows.

So far it's been run on a small single estate. It isn't aimed at thousands of endpoints and hasn't been load-tested at that size. It runs as one server process with SQLite and an in-memory job broker, which keeps deployment simple.

Vitrinode's approach

The main difference is what the server is trusted to do and what it's able to run. Architecture and Security go into the full design.

Device identity

The device's private key is generated on the device and never sent anywhere. During provisioning, which uses a short-lived single-use token, the server signs its CSR. Server to agent traffic is mutual TLS, and revocation is checked against the server's records on every request instead of trusting the handshake.

Human authentication

WebAuthn/FIDO2 only. There's no password sign-in in normal operation.

Typed jobs

The list of actions is short and fixed: system.status, systemd.list, systemd.status, apt.list_updates and systemd.restart. Arbitrary shell execution isn't on the list and won't be. Jobs are signed by the server and carry a nonce and an expiry so they can't be replayed. systemd.restart also needs step-up, and is only created and dispatched for a TRUSTED device. Jobs are submitted through the server API for now.

Privilege separation

lg-agent runs unprivileged. Anything that needs root goes to a separate, tightly scoped lg-executor process over a local socket, and the executor checks each job's signature again before it runs. A compromised agent can't just run whatever it wants as root.

Step-up authentication

A fresh WebAuthn check, enforced by the server, is needed for device revocation, attestation re-baselining, adding a security key and the privileged systemd.restart job. Each SSH certificate request gets its own single-use check, tied to that request. Read-only jobs only need a valid session.

Audit trail

Sign-ins, revocation, the job lifecycle and SSH certificate issuance are written to an append-only audit log on the server. There's no interface for browsing it yet.

Proxmox correlation

Read-only, against one Proxmox cluster: VM and container inventory and power state, matched against agent connectivity so you can see when what Proxmox says and what the agent says don't agree. No start, stop, reboot or other lifecycle actions.

Authentication and attestation

A valid device certificate tells you which enrolled device is talking. It doesn't tell you the host hasn't been tampered with or that it's in a known-good state. Vitrinode tracks that part separately. Where there's a hardware TPM it takes a vTPM quote over PCR state, and where there isn't it falls back to software evidence, which is clearly marked as weaker. The result is kept as the device's trust state. "Enrolled and authenticating" and "attested" are two different things, and the interface shows them separately.

Current limitations

These are gaps in what's built so far, not decisions. The roadmap has what's planned.

  • Inventory (system, storage, network, systemd, APT, Docker) is collected and stored but isn't fully shown in the interface yet.
  • Package inventory works for APT. RPM-based collection for SUSE and RHEL isn't done yet.
  • No history of what has changed on a host yet, so no comparing a host against an earlier state and no alerts when it drifts.
  • Short-lived SSH certificates are in development and signed by a development-only software CA. Device-bound certificates have been tested on disposable hosts but not rolled out to enrolled hosts. There's no certificate revocation list and no browser terminal. The production CA key is meant to live on dedicated signing hardware (Vitrinode-HSM), which is in development and not connected yet.
  • Jobs are submitted through the server API. Interfaces for jobs and audit are planned.
  • No Proxmox lifecycle operations (start, shutdown, reboot). Correlation is read-only.
  • Proxmox VE is currently the only supported hypervisor.

Design constraints

Arbitrary shell or general-purpose command execution doesn't fit the typed job model, and the job registry isn't meant to accept it. Package handling uses each distribution's own tooling: APT/dpkg now, with RPM-based tooling for SUSE and RHEL planned but not built.

Outside the current scope

  • Thousands of endpoints (not load-tested)
  • Multi-region deployment
  • Multi-tenancy
  • Commercial billing
  • Large-scale event ingestion
  • Multiple independent Proxmox clusters

How this compares to plain SSH

For flexible, interactive admin work SSH is the better tool. Vitrinode covers a smaller set of routine operations through typed jobs, and keeps device identity, revocation, inventory and audit records in one place. You give up flexibility in what can be run, and in return the server can only run a known set of things.

When Vitrinode isn't the right fit

  • You need to manage Windows or macOS.
  • You need thousands of endpoints.
  • You need declarative configuration enforcement.
  • You need to run arbitrary shell commands or playbooks.
  • You need production SSH certificate issuance today.
  • You need multi-tenancy.
  • You need multiple Proxmox clusters.
  • You need VMware or Hyper-V integration.
  • You need a mature commercial RMM or support platform.

Where it fits alongside existing tools

Vitrinode handles identity, inventory and a limited set of operations. Other tools keep doing what they're good at:

Ansible

Keep it for configuration enforcement and broad automation. Vitrinode doesn't do desired-state config management.

Proxmox

Keep it for managing the hypervisor. Vitrinode compares what Proxmox reports with what the agent reports, and doesn't control the hypervisor.

SSH / Teleport / Tailscale

Keep them for interactive access. Vitrinode's jobs cover a smaller, typed set of things, and when you need a real shell you still use one.